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Gender Matters, Race Matters
Judith Resnik *
As the luncheon speaker, I was asked to take a step back from the
specific issue of an all-girls school in New York City. Instead of focusing'
on the experiences of girls between the ages often and eighteen in middle
and high schools, I was asked to speak about women over the age of
twenty-one, in legal education and in law. The questions are several:
What do we know about the experiences of women who go to law school?
About women who go to court? About those who work in law firms?
The answers on one level are straightforward. A growing body of
articles and essays provides a wealth of data offering some insights into the
experiences of women in law schools. Students -- such as those who have
enabled this symposium -- deserve a good deal of credit. Students have
been the pioneers in creating journals about women in law and in bringing
attention to the experiences of women in law schools.
For example, in the late 1980s, a group of about twenty women
at Yale Law School felt themselves alienated. They thought that their
experiences of law school differed from that of their male counterparts.
They decided to do a small study to explore the dimensions of difference
and to understand what they termed to be their relative "powerlessness. '
What they did was try to keep track of who spoke in classes and what
responses were elicited. What they reported was that women law students
participated less than did men in class; that when women did speak, their
comments were greeted with less than full attention; and that their points
• All rights reserved. © Judith Resnik. Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
These remarks are related to a series of my essays, including AskingAbout Gender in Courts,
21 SIGNS 952 (Summer, 1996) and Naturally' Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1782 (1991). My thanks to Hari Osofsky for able research
assistance.
1. Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L.
Rnv. 1299, 1300 (1988).
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were ignored.2
The Yale student study has been followed by several others,
including data reported in 1994 by Professors Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine,
Jane Balin, Ann Bartow, and Deborah Lee Stachel.3 With the support of
the dean of the University of Pennsylvania, the researchers examined the
undergraduate records and law school admissions scores of women and
men entering that law school.
The researchers concluded that the undergraduate academic
profiles were basically identical, with equally well-credentialed women
and men in the entering class. Gender did not distinguish them. The
researchers then looked at the performance of law students once in law
school. Although women and men students had been fungible on the
"predicators" -- entering grades and LSAT scores -- women did not get as
good grades as did the men. Rather, by the end of the first year, "men
were three times more likely than women to be in the top ten percent of
their law school class."4 This study also found that women in their first
year were more critical than men of the experience at law school, but by
their third year, women had become less critical than were men.5 The
name of this article is Becoming Gentlemen and its argument is that, at
least at the law school studied, legal education alienates women students
in formal settings such as the large law school class, excludes women in
various ways from informal means of learning, and the women who
succeed do so by "becoming gentlemen." Not surprisingly, the
2. I was fortunate during the 1996-97 academic year to be one of the subjects of a parallel
study, undertaken by Professor Catherine Krupnick of Harvard's Education School, who
attended first year classes at NYIs Law School where I visited. Catharine educated me about
what she terms the geography of a classroom and about the interactive dynamics, both among
students within one class and as students move from class to class.
3. See Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, Jane Balin, Ann Bartow & Deborah Lee Stachel,
Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 1 (1994).
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.
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recommendation is for legal education there -- and implicitly at many
other law schools -- to change its modes.
If one genre of this work is to look at particular law schools and
do what some social scientists might describe as a "case study," another is
to look across different law schools in an effort to consider whether law
school cultures vary. For example, in the late 1980s, Professor Taunya
Banks sent surveys to students at fourteen law schools and garnered
almost 2000 responses from law students.6 Professor Banks found that
more women than men perceive law school classrooms to be "alienating
and hostile."7 Women students reported lack of encouragement from their
teachers (who were frequently men), hostility from their male peers, and
generalized distress.
Such efforts to gather information come not only from law
students and professors but also from the bar. In the winter of 1996, the
American Bar Association's Commission on Women in the Profession
released a report that concluded that "many women still experience
debilitating instances of gender bias and discrimination in law schools."8
Relying on the receipt of testimony about legal education from around the
country, the report found that, for both students and teachers, gender
remains an organizing principle of many people's experiences and
sometimes of their success.
These studies are but a few of the many efforts underway
addressing the role of gender in law schools and of law schools' role in
making gender meaningful. The activities considered range from teacher
6. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 So. ILL. L.J. 527, 528 (1990)
(describing the administration of surveys at four private and ten public law schools located in the
East, the West, the South and North-central United States (response rates paralleled law school
demographics, in that respondents were 60 percent male and 40 percent female at a time when
women comprised about 42 percent of the entering class)).
7. Id. at 529.
8. ABA COMMSSION oNWoMEN, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL
EDUCATION (Jan. 1996).
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evaluations9 and moot court to clinical programs and more traditional law
classes.'" The methodologies vary, from testimony and personal
descriptions to quantitative work, such as that recently undertaken by the
Law School Admissions Council" and currently underway by a
consortium of law schools, all pursuing research to learn whether
experiences reported in studies of any particular institution are borne out
across different law schools.
As I report on these efforts to collect data, I need also note the
limitations of the information gathered. I can tell you less than I would
like about if and how experiences differ among women and men. Much
of this literature uses the categories "men" and "women," and not
categories that mark the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and class.
Furthermore, in the few discussions that do turn to the question of people
of color, the diversity within that category is often not explored; we know
little about distinctive experiences either between women and men of
color or among different communities clumped under the rubric "of
color."
The absence of such data does not always stem from ignorance of
the importance of more nuanced information, but is explained in part by
the fact that, at least for quantitative work, the small numbers of people of
color who are students and teachers in law schools make it difficult to
have a sample size sufficient for conclusions about variations within and
across the categories of gender and of racialized or ethnic minorities.
Moreover, this picture is changing. Professor Amede Obiora has written
a critical review of the problem of gender in legal education and the role
9. See Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the LegalAcademy,
8 YALE J.L. & FEMIISM (1996).
10. See, e.g., Mar N. Morrison, May it Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates
Gender Bias in the "Real World" of Practice, 6 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 49 (1995).
11. Ken Meyers, Study of Gender Difference Finds I-L Women Draw Lower Grades, 17
NAT'L L.J. 1 (1995) (citing a study by Dr. Linda F. Wightman that found that gender is a
variable of predictive value, in that women perform in law school less well than predicted
by the LSATs).
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that race and class plays in concepts like "silence" in the classroom or in
assumptions about what is "proper" behavior for females. 2 Professor
Banks has also reported that she is looking at the perceptions of Hispanic
American and African American students to compare their experiences
with those of white male law students. 13
The growing data on women inside law schools is linked to an
impressive body of data about women in the legal profession and
specifically in courts. Having provided a snapshot of the kind of data
emerging from law schools, my second task is to remind you of the rich set
of materials discussing studies of gender, race, and ethnicity in courts. (I
will not here go into the literature on gender in law firms, but urge you to
read Professor Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's findings on women in practice here
in New York City.'4)
Some history is in order. In the 1960s and 1970s, women and
men concerned about women's rights found that some of the pain of
discrimination came from the very places to which they brought claims--
the courts. In an effort to educate judges about the discrimination that was
occurring under their aegis, the Legal Defense and Education Fund of the
National Organization of Women founded the "National Judicial
Education Program" (NJEP), which has worked in cooperation with the
National Association of Women Judges.' 5 The issue was titled "Gender
12. Amede Obiora, Neither Here Nor There, of the Female in American Legal Education,
1996 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 355.
13. Banks, supra note 6, at 535 (explaining that given the small numbers, women and men
are included together).
14. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Robert Saute, Bonnie Oglensky & Martha Gever, Glass
Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advance in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
291 (1995).
15. See Norma Juliet Wikler, On the Judicial Agenda for the 80's: Equal Treatment for
Men and Women in the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 202 (1980) (as founding director of the
NJEP, Dr. Wikler summarized the evidence of gender based stereotypes and of the new
project to educate judges); Norma J. Wikler, Water on Stone: A Perspective on the Movement
to Eliminate Gender Bias in the Courts, 26 CoURT RFVIEW 6 (Fall, 1989) (history of
founding of NJEP).
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Bias in the Courts," and a principle mechanism for responding became the
creation of "Gender Bias Task Forces.'
6
New Jersey led the way in 1982 when Chief Justice Robert N.
Wilentz of that state's Supreme Court created the first such Task Force.17
New Jersey also gets the credit for being first with a task force on
"Minorities in the Courts." (And, in 1997, New Jersey's Supreme Court,
now under the leadership of Chief Justice Debra Poritz, has pioneered
again by forming a task force on gay and lesbians in courts.8)
By 1988, the Chief Justices of all the state courts adopted a
resolution calling for study of gender, racial, and ethnic bias. 19 By the
spring of 1990, "task force activity [on gender was] underway in some
thirty jurisdictions" in the United States.20 In March of 1995, at the first
National Conference of the Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Bias in the
Courts, about twenty jurisdictions reported on their work on those issues.
During almost the first decade of the work, the 1980s, task forces
on gender, race, and ethnic bias in the courts were exclusively the domain
of state courts. Beginning in the 1990s, the federal courts began to take
16. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating the Judiciary about Gender Bias, 9 WoMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 109, 124 (1986) (as Executive Director of the NJEP, describing its "dream" to
be "a task force in every state").
17. See FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN
tN THE COURTS (June, 1984) at 4; see also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias
in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280, 281 (1987).
18. The Supreme Court's Task Force on Gay and Lesbian Issues is co-chaired by the Hon. B.
Thomas Bowen and by Elizabeth Zuckerman and is scheduled to report in 1998. See Letter
from the Chief Justice, Debra Poritz of June 30, 1997 (on file with the author)..
19. See 26 S. CT. REv. 5 (1989). In 1993, the Conference of Chief Justices reaffirmed this
position and called for implementation of reforms. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution
Urging Further Efforts for Equal Treatment of All Persons (adopted Jan. 28, 1993) (available
from the National Center for State Courts).
20. Betty Weinberg Ellerin, Chair of the National Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts
of the National Association of Women Judges, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN JUDGES (September 4, 1990) (on file with author).
See generally Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for
JudicialReform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1989) (reviewing the achievements).
224 [Vol. XIV
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up the question of gender. In 1992, the Ninth Circuit became the first
within the federal system to issue a report on this topic.2 As of 1996, the
Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia had. published reports, and
during 1997, reports are to be published by the First, Second, Third,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.22
Moving from the history of the projects, I turn now to a very brief
survey of their findings. Typically, task forces review an array of topics,
including the application of substantive legal doctrine (issues such as
criminal law, women as victims of domestic violence, family law,
immigration, bankruptcy, and federal benefits); the court as a workspace
(with a focus on courtroom interactions and dynamics); women and men
as professionals in and staff of the courts (with data on demographics);
and the role of the court as an institution (considering issues involving
courts as -employers and as institutions with authority to make
appointments and the like).
The conclusions from the more than 40 reports published by task
forces on gender, race, and ethnicity prompt the title for the talk: gender
matters, race matters. For example, New York found in 1986 that:
[wiomen uniquely, disproportionately and with
unacceptable frequency must endure a climate of
condescension, indifference and hostility.23
Connecticut concluded in 1991 that:
women are treated differently from men in the justice
21. See THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: FINAL REPORT (July 1993), republished at 67 So. CAL. L. REv. 727
(1994) [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT, THE EFFECTS OF GENDER].
22. The Judicial Conference of the United States, the policy-making arm of the federal
judiciary, has endorsed these efforts as has Congress in the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, Title IV, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1902. Summaries of the
activities can be found in Judith Resnik, Activities and Publications related to Gender, Race,
and Ethnicity in the Courts (Aug. 1997) (on file with the author).
23. NEW YORK JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT OF THE NEW
YoRK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, republished at 15 FoRDHAM URBAN L.J. 11,
17-18 (1986).
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system and, because of it, many suffer from unfairness,
embarrassment, emotional pain, professional deprivation
and economic hardship.24
In January of 1997, Tennessee's task force concluded that:
gender bias in Tennessee's legal system prevents the
participation of women therein. While many corrective
measures have been taken ... evidence of gender bias
persists. 21
From states as disparate as California, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, and
Minnesota, one learns that women seeking redress for violence within their
homes (misnamed, in my view, "domestic" violence) are often either
blamed, accused of provoking their attacks, treated as if the experiences
were trivial, or disbelieved.26 More than twenty reports describe that
24. REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE COURTS
12 (1991); see also REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY
COMMISSION 42 (1990) (finding that "gender bias permeates Florida's legal system today");
The 1990 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 3, 5, 15,
16, 25, 28 (1990) (finding that women are "at a disadvantage during divorce settlement
negotiations;" rape victims are discouraged from prosecuting "by the treatment they receive
from the system;" and while there are not plentiful examples of "overt discrimination,"
"evidence that more subtle forms of bias persist"); MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE
ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER
BIAS IN THE COURTS, at iii-iv (1989) ("women's negative experiences cover the range from
the aggravating to the life-threatening"); WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND
JUSTICE IN THE COURTS, GENDER & JUSTICE IN THE COURTS, at xvi (1989) ("[Glender
discrimination exists and can negatively impact judicial decision making and affect the
outcome of litigation.").
25. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GENDER FAIRNESS, at 1 (submitted to The Tennessee
Supreme Court Jan. 15, 1997).
26. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND
MEN IN THE COURTS, THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS at 4-5 (1990); GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A REPORT
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMM'N ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 19-21 (1991); EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN, KENTUCKY TASK FORCE ON
GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS 28 (1992); REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON
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women as witnesses sometimes face special hurdles; their credibility can
be readily questioned, their claims of injury undervalued.27
When the focus is on race and ethnicity, the reports are similarly
distressing. In 1989, Michigan found that:
there is evidence that bias does occur with disturbing
frequency at every level of the legal profession and court
system.28
The State of Washington's report concluded that:
minorities... [do not] trust the court system to resolve
their disputes or administer justice even-handedly.29
In 1991, New York's task force reported that:
the perception [is] that minorities are stripped of their
human dignity, their individuality and their identity in their
encounters with the court system.
30
Criminal justice is a place of special concern, with reports on inequity in
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 2-5 (1989); MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR
GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT, -reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
825, 872-77 (1989); see also THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND
ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 119 (District of Columbia,
1992) ("cross-examination of victims tends to be more hostile in sexual assault cases than
in other assault cases").
27. Almost all of the jurisdictions that have published gender bias task force reports
address questions of credibility as parts of discussions of domestic violence, sexual assault,
courtroom interaction, or of rights sought by women litigants under employment and federal
benefits law. Many of the reports detail the specific problems faced by women testifying
about sexual aggression.
28. FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC
ISSUES IN THE COURTS 2 (1989) [hereinafter MICHIGAN RAcE/ETHNIC REPORT]; see also
NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS, FINAL REPORT, I NEW J. LAWYER 1225,
1230 (Aug. 10, 1992) ("Minority litigants, minority witnesses, and minority attorneys are
subjected to racial and ethnic slights from all levels of court and security personnel-from
the bailiff to the bench.").
29. WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE, WASHINGTON STATE
MINORITY AND JUSTICE TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, at xxi-xxii (1990).
30. 2 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMN ON MINORITIES 150-51 (1991)
(published in five volumes) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT ON MINORITIES].
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sentencing.3 Further, language may also be a barrier. As the 1991
Florida report put it:
evidence in Florida suggests that the rights of non-English
speaking defendants are systematically being
compromised due to the lack of trained, qualified court
interpreters.32
In short, just as studies of law school find that gender organizes
experiences in important ways, so do studies of courts tell us that gender
has more predictive value than we had hoped. And while both women
and men have "gender," the pains of gender are not evenly distributed, but
fall disproportionately on women. And, just as the studies of law schools
are thin on the experiences of racialized minorities and ethnicity but
thicker on descriptions of gender, so too are the studies of courts similarly
tilted. More reports exist about the category "women" than the category
"race and ethnicity." And, again, the picture is changing, as work on
gender and work on race and ethnicity begin to expand to consider the
intersections and to explore experiences marked by gender, race, and
ethnicity.
Let me use one illustration from the work of the federal task force
commissioned by the D.C. Circuit.33 1700 attorneys responded to a
questionnaire sent by the task force in which they were asked whether,
during the past five years, federal judges had either questioned their status
as lawyers or assumed that they were not lawyers. The report tells us that'
31. 1 NEW YORK REPORT ON MINORITIES, supra note 30, at 43; see also ALASKA JuDICIAL
COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS: A MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
27-36 (1974-1976) (stating that Blacks received higher sentences in several categories of cases);
INTERIM REPORT OF THE ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ON FINDINGS OF APPARENT RACIAL,
DISPARITY IN SENTENCING 54 (1979) (reporting that race of Blacks and Native Alaskans is a
factor in denial of probation).
32. 2 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RACIAL AND
ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMM'N: "WHERE THE INJURED FLY FOR JUSTICE," at viii (1991).
33. See Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias
Task Force Project in the D.C. Circuit, 84 GEo. L.J. 1657 (1996).
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one percent of the white men said that a judge had done so to them.
About ten percent of both men of color and of white women responded a
judge had made that mistake, and thirty-three percent of the women of
color said they had experienced this problem." With this one vignette, we
are reminded of the importance of not assuming that the experiences of
those in the categories women and men are uniform. An aggregate
statement -- twelve percent of the women and two percent of men have
had this experience -- distorts important variations. Not all "men" nor all
"women" have the same experiences, nor do all those "of color" have the
same experiences.
One other point about the literature on experiences of women and
men of all colors in law schools and in courts is important to keep in mind.
A leit motif of this literature is that the relevance of gender is not reported
equally by men and by women. Similarly, the relevance of race is not
reported equally by those who fall within the category "majority" and those
who fall within the rubric of "minority." In theory, variables such as age
and role (judge/lawyer, teacher/student) might be critical, but in almost all
of the quantitative studies, gender and race are the key. Here let me use
an example from the Ninth Circuit study; I served as a member of that task
force. From male lawyers, in small and large firms, public and private,
young or old, we leamed that they perceived gender to be either irrelevant
or rarely relevant to case assignment, promotion, hiring, and selection for
committees. Similarly, from the more than eighty percent of the judges
who responded, male judges reported that gender was not relevant to
34. See id. at 1743 (stating that nine percent of white women, nine to ten percent of men
of color, thirty-three percent of women of color, and one percent of white men so reported);
see also MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME COURT COMMISSION TO STUDY RACIAL AND ETHNIC
BIAS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME COURT COMMISSION
TO STUDY RACIAL AND ETHNIc BIAS IN THE COURTS: EQUAL JUSTICE: ELIMINATING BARRIERS
3 (1994) (discussing as one of the factors leading to the creation of the task force was an event,
in 1988, when two court officers "mistook" an African American Assistant Attorney General for
a "defendant and attempted to bar him, in an inappropriate manner, from gaining access to a part
of the courtroom that he was entitled to enter").
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much around them.
In contrast, women lawyers (whether working in a big or small
firm, public or private practice) and women judges (whether trial,
appellate, administrative, magistrate, or bankruptcy), whether young (here
defined as under forty) or old (here defined as over forty) perceived
gender to be relevant sometimes, often, or on occasion. In other words,
while men report mostly that gender has little relevance, women report
mostly that gender has some relevance -- not all the time, but not never.
Moreover, the reports of gender's relevance, coming from women, are that
gender can work to their detriment, in both process and outcome."
This pattern of very different perceptions and perspectives is
mirrored in the reports on gender and on race and ethnicity. People of
color report that color matters in courts and law firms; people whose color
is white generally report that color makes little or no difference. 6
To summarize, through individual, independent efforts and
through formal commissions organized by bar associations and by courts,
researchers have asked about the relationships among gender, race,
ethnicity, and the processes of law. Through these efforts, women's voices
-- repeated, collected, aggregated, and moving from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction -- have made a space for claims that gender matters, and that
it matters to women's detriment, in places such as law schools and courts
in which gender is supposed not to matter -- in the sense of organizing
either access, participation, or outcomes.
Moreover, in these last few years, the concepts of gender and race
have come to be understood as interactive rather than distinctive
categories. While the phrase "women and minorities" is oft-repeated in
law, participants in law are coming to understand that "women" include
those of all colors and that "minorities" include those of both genders.
In addition to providing data mapping the experiences of women
35. See NINTH CIRCUIT, THE EFFECTS OF GENDER, supra note 21, at 963-1001.
36. See MICHIGAN RACE/ETHNIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 13 (describing "majority males"
as the least likely to perceive bias exists).
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and men in their multiplicities within law, the studies have formed the
basis for change. Some "progress" -- measured in terms such as
appointments to faculties and to the bench; integration of committees; and
programs to educate law students, law teachers, judges and lawyers about
stereotypic patterns -- has occurred. Bias is now a topic of judicial
conferences, of lawyers' meetings, and of private discussions.37
Continuing legal education includes programs on race, gender, and
ethnicity. Courts have developed handbooks on equal treatment and offer
training programs on the problems of victims of violence.38
Further, the topic of gender, race, and ethnic bias is making its
way not only into education programs but also into rules. Sexual
harassment policies have been developed39 and canons of ethics
rewritten.' A body of law is emerging as well. In a few reported cases,
37. See, for example, the resolution enacted unanimously by the officers of the Essex County
Bar Association of New Jersey, calling for (inter alia) a "permanent task force" on issues of
racial/ethnic discrimination in the courts; a revised bail system "free of bias [that] ... gives
minimum weight to economic criteria because such factors generally impact unfairly upon racial
minorities;" "cautionary jury instructions relative to . . . cross-racial identification"; the
"establishment of a non-discriminatory bar examination;" and a requirement that judges read and
post statements "opposing racial and ethnic bias in the courts." Memorandum of Robert D.
Lipscher to Hon. Theodore Z. Davis, Comments on the Final Report of the Supreme Court Task
Force on Minority Concerns 3-4 (Dec. 28, 1992) (on file with the author).
38. See FIVE YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE
COURTS 27-31 (1991). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Gender Bias in the Courts, What Can
Judges Do?, 81 JUDICATURE 15 (1997).
39. See, e.g., United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Sexual Harassment Policy
1 (July 1996) (prohibiting harassment by a "judicial officer, a court official, an employee of the
court or a related govemmental agency"); Western District of Washington, United States District
Court and Bankruptcy Courts, Sexual Harassment Policy I (adopted February, 1993) (applicable
to "a member of the District or Bankruptcy Clerk's Offices, Probation Office, Pretrial Services
Office, or judicial staff" as well as to "any non-staff person") (on file with the author).
40. See, e.g., Mich. Bar Approves Antibias Rulesfor Codes of Conduct, 15 BAR LEADER,
Nov.-Dec., 1990, at 4-5 (state bar approved new rules that provide that lawyers and judges
not "engage in invidious discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age,
sexual orientation, or ethnic origin and shall prohibit staff and agents subject to the lawyer's
direction and control from doing so."); American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial
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lawyers have been sanctioned for making racist and sexist remarks in court
or in depositions.4' Convictions and judgments have been reversed on
findings that during a trial, a judge or jury was prejudiced against women
and/or people of color. One example -- coming from a case decided in
South Carolina -- details both the problem and a court's response.
A man named Beondi Clifford Pace was on trial for grand larceny,
accused of theft of a pair of tennis shoes from a sports store. His female
defense lawyer asked a question about a prosecution witness's criminal
record. The trial judge sustained the government's objection and, out of
hearing of jury, told her that the "fishing expedition" she was on was
improper.42 During that exchange, again off the record, the trial judge
called the defense lawyer a "nice girl" and a "pretty girl.""s Later, the trial
judge told the jury that the question was not proper but rather a "pitch in
the dark," and that she [the defense counsel] had "apologized." He went
on:
I hate to fuss at a pretty girl... a pretty girl I hate to fuss.
But it was a kind of below the belt shot. But she was
doing the best, she thought. But anyhow, as she gains
experience--if they don't give it to her all she does have to
do is ask me, and I certainly will .... So don't hold it
against her. She is a nice girl."
On appeal, the intermediate appellate court commented that the remarks
were suboptimal: "[i]t is doubtful a trial judge would consciously address
a male attorney as a 'nice boy' or a 'handsome boy."'45 Further, "gender
has no place in determining the standing of members of the legal
Conduct Canon 2(C) (1990) ("A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that
practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.").
41. See Jackson, supra note 38.
42. State v. Pace, 425 S.E. 2d 73, 75 (S.C. App. 1992).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 75-76.
45. Id. at 76.
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profession. Female attorneys should not be addressed by any court in a
manner which belittles them or intimates to them or others that they are
viewed differently by the court."' It was not "prejudicial" error, however,
so the defendant Pace lost on the merits.47
In contrast, the Supreme Court.of South Carolina -reversed and
required a new trial.48 The Court reasoned that, by impugning the
credibility of counsel, the trial judge had hurt the defense's alibi; the trial
judge had "undermined counsel's ability to effectively represent her
client."49 South Carolina's Supreme Court also excused the failure of
counsel to object. In its view, given "the tone and tenor of the trial judge's
remarks," such objections would have been "futile. 50
Hence, this symposium, about single sex education in schools,
comes at a time when concerns about the education and work of women
in law are plainly in focus. I began my comments by asking: What do we
know about women in law schools and working in law? I suggested that,
at one level, the answers were straightforward: Because of enormous and
sustained work across the United States, we are beginning to know a lot.
Some celebration is in order, for a measure of success can fairly be
claimed. Gender, race, ethnicity (and to a much lesser extent, class and
sexual orientation) are on educational agendas, on rulemaking agendas,
and in the law. One might fairly tell the story of the last fifteen years as
filled with substantial progress, in which issues once considered of little
interest are now not only in view, but also becoming integrated into
programs of education and into rules of law.
Yet another way to answer my opening questions exists, one that
is less straightforward, less optimistic, and more plainly linked to the
subject matter of this symposium, single-sex education and the question
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See State v. Pace, 447 S.E. 2d 186 (S.C. 1994).
49. Id. at 187.
50. Id.
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of the Young Leadership Institute for Girls, described in the press as the
"all girls school in East Harlem."5' While one may rightly celebrate fifteen
years of hard work and various measures of success, this conference
demonstrates that we are but at the beginning of the conversation, and not
anywhere near knowing enough or sorting out all that has been learned.
A good deal of the work thus far -- on gender, race, and ethnicity
in law schools and in courts -- has been the easy part. Please do not hear
me as saying that the work has been "easy" in terms of energy,
commitment, effort, or pain. The last two decades of achievements are the
results of a huge amount of effort. Painstaking, labor-intensive work
generated the materials to which I have adverted. Further, those who have
undertaken this work have often been met with anger and, upon occasion,
retaliation. Some have tried to stop these projects, even arguing that such
work undermines the independence of the judiciar. 5 2
But what is, in retrospect, "easy" is one of the underlying
messages. Over the past fifteen -years, a story of absence has been
documented. What has been learned through all the materials I have
described is that most women of all colors and men of color are in small
numbers on most judiciaries, on many law school faculties, and in many
law schools' student bodies. The story that emerges is one of exclusion,
and that kind of story is a relatively easy one to tell. For example, once the
task forces collectively pushed the demography of the judiciary into plain
view and the predominance of maleness and whiteness came to be seen,
the remedial response of diversifying that work-force also became plain.
It is not that the struggle for what Judge Leon Higginbotham terms
'judicial pluralism"53 has been won or that "affirmative action" efforts are
51. See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, Crew Says No to Compromise on All-Girls Middle School,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, at B3; Jacques Steinberg, At a New School, No Boys, Less Fussing,
and a Freer Spirit, N.Y. TnMms, Feb. 1, 1997, at A3.
52. See Lawrence Silberman, Political Correctness Rebuffed, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y
759 (1996) (reprinted from a speech delivered to the Federalist Society).
53. Leon A. Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American
Experience and the South African Challenge, 42 DUKE L.J. 1028 (1993).
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popular, but rather that some success has been achieved in making
implausible overt hostility to pluralism. Whether from the left or the right,
political parties speak of the need for such inclusion and prominently
display individuals of both sexes and of a variety of races and ethnicities
(less frequently of differing sexual orientations) as emblems of their
commitment to inclusion. Thus, and again in retrospect, cases about overt
exclusion of women -- such as the VMI and Citadel litigations -- are
"easy."' Absolute bars to women's participation in the social and political
life of the community are no longer acceptable. But as the debate about
affirmative action so plainly indicates, pulling down old barriers under a
banner of inclusion is a goal very different from either diversification or
transformation. Inclusion of "others" within the current framework may
not entail acknowledgement that those others have different experiences
or visions, requiring more than replication. The complicated questions are
not whether to let women into VMI or the Citadel -- or to law schools and
practice -- but what to do once women are there. If "knob" hair cuts are
de rigueur for the boy plebs, must women -- for whom a shorn head is a
marker of shame -- have the same haircut? And, once the issue is raised,
what about the orthodox Jewish man who attends a school such as VMI?
What happens to rules about head shaving when women are included and
when men of diverse racialized, ethnic, and religious backgrounds are
identified?
While discussions have moved beyond a conception of women
and men as unitary categories and begun to embrace the concept of
"intersectionality" (that we are all raced, gendered, classed, and identified
by a range of characteristics of varying saliency depending on the context),
we have neither faced nor resolved the painful conflicts everyday more
apparent. Marking intersections does not instruct us on how to negotiate
them, nor permit escape from evidence that conflicts of race, ethnicity,
class, and gender criss-cross those very lines.
54. See Virginia v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 331.
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That is why the "all girls school of East Harlem" is the hard case.
Here we are -- without ready escape -- face to face with the relationships
among class, race, ethnicity, gender, and the barriers in society, and here
is where people of good will, hoping to make something better, battle
about how to proceed.
